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Abstract: Army culture does not currently value or incentivize education and broadening for senior leaders, as it did prior to 1950. Various structural factors, such as the creation of a mega-bureaucracy,
co-equal service branches, and a fixation with tactics, have contributed to the decline in numbers of educated and broadened leaders in
the molds of Generals Pershing, MacArthur, and Eisenhower. The
Army’s strategic performance since the Korean War is symptomatic
of this cultural decline.

O

n October 12, 1972, General Creighton Abrams became Chief
of Staff of the Army (CSA), a promotion that symbolized the
further devaluation of broadly educated leaders in favor of
tactically minded “centurions.” Centurions in the Roman legions, combining the command authority of a contemporary company commander
with the experience of a sergeant major who directed tactics. Superior
legates or generals orchestrated campaigns to achieve Rome’s strategic
objectives.1 Abrams epitomized the tactically centered centurion paradigm, and it is no small irony the US main battle tank bears his name. In
his mold, well-meaning but misguided Army leaders of the post-World
War II era, have championed tactical career progression that stunted
officer strategic broadening, and ensured the rise of centurions often
incapable of performing as true “generalists.” The institution’s transition
from valuing an officer career path that produced sufficiently developed
leaders helped birth the so-called training revolution, which Abrams and
like-minded leaders enshrined. These men sought to ensure “no more
Task Force Smiths” would occur, referring to an untrained and underequipped Army task force that North Korean tanks rolled over in 1950.
This simplistic “lesson” still resonates within the Department of the
Army, which recently opted to preserve brigade readiness at the expense
of middle-management at headquarters, ignoring the likelihood Task
Force Smith was symptomatic of overall institutional decline.2 General
William DuPuy’s view of the quintessential Army leader was molded as
a junior officer who experienced an earlier version of Task Force Smith
1      Adrian Keith Goldsworthy, The Roman Army at War, 100 BC—AD 200 (Oxford, UK:
Clarendon Publishers, 1996), 31-36. While the article’s content and errors remain mine, I want to
thank Dr. John A. Bonin for suggesting the centurion analogy, as well as Dr. Larry Tritle, Dr. Edward
Gutierrez, Dr. Leonard Wong, LTC Mike Shekleton, MAJ Rob Grenier, and LTC Donald Travis for
their assistance with this article.
2      This included Corps HQs, which then CSA General Joe Lawton Collins rapidly increased
from one to eight by summer 1951. James F. Schnabel, Policy and Directives the First Year (Washington,
DC: Center of Military History, 1992), 30, 64, 72, for some of the corps. Unit histories contains
Corps activation dates.
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in the days following the Normandy invasion.3 DuPuy later became the
architect of Abrams’ tactical colossus.
Fixation on tactics instead of strategy reflected the searing of dangerous World War II combat experiences into DuPuy, Abrams, General
William Westmoreland, and others of their generation. Dispassionate
analysis, however, informed but not overcome by experience, often
occurs only at a safe distance from the subject matter at hand, and these
leaders seemed incapable of distinguishing institutional maintenance
from individual combat. Experiences such as those of Dupuy do have
some merit, revealing how insufficient tactical preparedness led to
unnecessary casualties in America’s first battles and beyond.4 The choice
of developing strategic thinkers is not a zero-sum game with tactical
wherewithal, however, as Army formations must also maintain tactical
effectiveness. The shift to a centurion paradigm has come at a cost.

The Army’s Tactical Paradigm

In some ways, the battlefield-dominant US Army created by these
men has become a more ethical version of the Wehrmacht, which the
institution intentionally sought to emulate in the years after WWII. The
Army has developed a force capable of winning nearly every firefight,
while simultaneously blunting its development of strategic leaders. The
outcomes of wars clearly rest on more than military strategy. Factors
such as poor policy, enemy efficiency and will, resources, and luck also
affect outcomes. However, the Army’s painfully obvious inability to
achieve national objectives since the Korean War against the likes of
the Islamic State of the Levant (ISIL), the Taliban, Iraqi and Somali
insurgents, and the North Vietnamese Army, reveals an institution in
need of reform.5 The debate over these failures has centered on martial
frameworks such as counterinsurgency versus conventional operations
and AirLand Battle doctrines.6 Elevating the discourse above the operational and tactical levels of war, Army leaders must demote the centurion
mentality in favor of a model better reflective of the institution’s diverse
past, while retaining the best of the tactical revolution. A comparison
of the pedigrees of the Chiefs of Staff of the Army (CSAs) before and
after 1950 demonstrates the transformation to a centurion-led Army that
has ultimately undermined the institution’s ability to contribute to the
achievement of national objectives.
The lack of military success during a time of American technological and training advantages indicates the shortcomings of US Army
culture.7 While Brian Linn, Tom Ricks, and others have commented on
the Army’s strategic inability, none has tied it to the decline of officer

3      Thomas E. Ricks, The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today (New
York: Penguin Press, 2012), 244.
4      Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, eds., America’s Fist Battles, 1776-1965 (Lawrence, KS:
University Press of Kansas, 1986), x-xi.
5      For example see, H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), which
indicts senior civilian and military officials for the Vietnam crisis.
6      This debate is well-documented and includes writings by Peter Mansoor, Andrew Birtle,
John Nagl, David Kilcullen, Gian Gentile, and others. For a useful summary see, Matthew Morton,
“Learning from the Past, Looking To the Future,” Parameters 45, no. 1 (Spring 2015): 53-67.
7      Culture is defined here as the officer corps’ beliefs, perceptions, experiences, and capabilities.
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broadening and structural factors.8 The post-Vietnam era also witnessed
the rise of management science in American society. This societal
transformation contributed to an Army institutional shift from valuing
broadly educated and experienced strategic thinkers, to parochial,
tactical, and technical centurions.9 The creation of the Department of
Defense in the aftermath of WWII weakened the Army’s ability to formulate strategy by rendering the institution a co-equal service branch,
while interposing unnecessary bureaucracy between top generals and
the US president.
Bureaucrats have ascended within this structure, while the Army
has become anti-intellectual.10 Ricks’ assertion the Army must relieve
more generals for ineffectiveness would fail to address this underlying
centurion problem, as replacements spawn from the same culture.11 The
Army’s anti-intellectual bent also suggests advanced degrees are irrelevant to warfare; no current four-star generals have doctorate degrees,
only one maintains a masters from a top-tier civilian university, and only
one serving lieutenant general holds a PhD.12 These numbers would disappoint reform-minded leaders such as Major General (ret. and former
commandant of the US Army War College) Robert Scales, who has
encouraged the intellectual development of Army leaders.13
While simply promoting leaders with advanced degrees to the
highest levels will not guarantee success, officers broadly educated can
better inform strategic discourse, having had their intellectual abilities
expanded to think deeply and widely about complex issues. It is fashionable for government agencies to lament a seemingly complex operating
environment (an ahistorical assertion)—should Army leaders not have
the education to grapple with such complexity? A centurion’s tactical
acumen might mold a foundation for higher leadership, but it is not a
prerequisite for strategic ability.
Since Vietnam, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army have generally been
less broadened, and more tactically minded, than at any other time
since the emergence of the United States as a world power during the
Spanish-American War (1898). Tactical expertise now represents the
current promotion paradigm, while the career of Dwight Eisenhower,
a distinguished Chief of Staff of the Army and President, exemplifies
a less flashy archetype. Without WWI combat experience, “Ike” today
would remain non-promoted to lieutenant colonel. So would CSA Omar
8      Brian Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2007), 7-8; and Ricks, The Generals, 458.
9      Antulio J. Echevarria II, Reconsidering the American Way of War (Washington DC: Georgetown
University Press, 2014), 135,140, highlights Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s attempted
use of management science; and Linn, The Echo of Battle, 7, describes a “hero” class of officers as
tending towards “warrior” status and anti-intellectualism.
10      Charles D. Allen and George J. Woods, “Developing Army Enterprise Leaders,” Military
Review 95, no. 4 (July-August 2015): 42-49.
11      Ricks, The Generals, 451-453.
12      US Department of the Army, “General Officer Management Course,” https://www.gomo.
army.mil/Ext/Portal/Officer/OfficerResume. A Department of the Army preliminary study
indicated that only 1/7 BGs (2011 class, courtesy Robert Grenier) received graduate education
at civilian institutions, and only two attended top-tier universities. US Department of the Army,
Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management, DA Pam 600-3 (Washington, DC:
US Department of the Army, 2014) defines broadening as any billet not considered necessary for
future command.
13      Robert H. Scales, “Too Busy to Learn,” United States Naval Institute. Proceedings 136, no. 2
(February 2010): 30-35.

30

Parameters 45(3) Autumn 2015

Bradley, who wintered WWI in Minnesota. Ike and Bradley performed
well in WWII without combat experience. Not all WWI “slick sleeves”
followed suit, however, as General Lloyd Fredendall, a highly regarded
pre-war trainer and II Corps Commander at Kasserine Pass (1942)
badly mangled the battle. Ike ultimately relieved him of duty.14 The
cases of Ike, Bradley, and Fredendall indicate that combat experience
and pre-war training may be desirable, but are unnecessary for adequate
performance. In 1943, the majority of the Army’s “elite” senior leadership lacked combat experience prior to that conflict.15
Tactical expertise, when confronted with an irregular enemy and
conditions not resembling the sands of the National Training Center
(NTC), has proven insufficient much like the case of training expert
Fredendall. Training centers, such as the National Training Center, not
only molded these leaders’ Army credentials, but their view of war as
a limited conventional engagement, necessarily bounded in time and
space by the astrategic parameters of the training area, and “won” by
maneuver and overwhelming firepower.16 Army officer evaluations once
noted how many rotations officers performed “in the box,” and books
on “winning” National Training Center were widely read in Army
circles, as opposed to studying actual American battles.17 Rigorous
tactical training has better prepared soldiers for first battles to prevent
Task Force Smiths. However, this training renaissance has not been
complemented by strategic rebirth.
Historian Peter Mansoor, a former brigade commander and General
David Petraeus’ executive officer during the “surge,” demonstrates how
in the early years of the second Iraq War, Generals John Abizaid (Central
Command or CENTCOM) and George Casey (Multi-National Force
Iraq) simply did not grasp the situation. Both made decisions counter
to the ways in which the “surge” later pacified the country long enough
to return it to Iraqi security forces, though as ISIL is proving, not long
enough.18 Ricks maintains Generals Tommy Franks (CENTCOM) and
Rick Sanchez (Commander, Combined Joint Task Force-7) previously
had understood the situation in Iraq even less.19
The post-Vietnam training revolution prepared leaders for tactical
conditions against Soviet-style forces, but as a byproduct, raised battle
success to the level of strategy. It also downplayed education at the
expense of training. As Ricks notes “…training tends to prepare one for
known problems, while education better prepares one for the unknown,
the unpredictable, and the unexpected.”20 The Army desperately sought
rasion d’ etre after defeat in Vietnam, as well as a firm budgetary basis
14      Rick Atkinson, An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943 (New York: Henry and
Hold Company, 2002), 272, 399-400.
15     Walter Millis, These are the Generals in Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and
Political Portrait (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1971), 160.
16      Ricks, The Generals, 349-350, and Linn, The Echo of Battle, 216, make similar points.
17      Conversation with Dr. John A. Bonin, Professor of Concepts and Doctrine, US Army War
College, June 2015, detailing his officer evaluation reports. There is a cottage industry of nonacademic books about “winning” at the NTC, such as: Adela Frame and James W. Lussier, 66 Stories
of Battle Command (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press,
2001); and James R. McDonough, The Defense of Hill 781 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988).
18      Peter R. Mansoor, Surge: My Journey with General Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 32, 45-46, 179, 183, 262.
19      Ricks, The Generals, 418-419.
20      Ibid., 419-420.
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to achieve relevance. The training revolution provided both. Abrams
and DePuy, despite warnings about the dumbing-down of officership,
focused the Army on the tactical level of war.21 Leaders with broadening limitations such as Franks, Sanchez, and Casey, have risen within
this culture. The performance of a well-educated Abizaid demonstrated
broadening is not a silver bullet, however, and training should not be
ignored while officers simply attend Harvard. As with Abizaid, leaders
sometimes operate on false assumptions (or the enemy gets it right). Yet
tactical obsession, with the advent of training center rotations as the
pinnacle of Army command has weakened the proclivity for strategic
thought. This paradigm emerged, in part, as a misnomer about G.I.
battlefield performance in WWII.
S.L.A Marshall’s (and others) inaccurate assessments of US Army
battlefield performance, as well as German generals’ ingratiating
accounts of their own successes against the Soviets, created the erroneous idea that the German army outfought the Americans.22 A telling
WWII German intelligence report around the time of the struggle for
Aachen, however, rated US divisions highly.23 The Wehrmacht did fight
well at the tactical level throughout the war, but poor strategy and an
inclination toward committing atrocities doomed its efforts—in some
ways a parallel with Army failures since 1965.24 The misnomer of US
forces fighting less well seeped into late-1940s Army doctrine as the
institution prepared to fight the emerging Soviet threat, and vestiges
of this focus on Wehrmacht success in battles survives today.25 It also
assisted in generating the training revolution.
Army victory in Panama, the Gulf War, and the opening stages
of Afghanistan and Iraq seemingly proved Abrams’ training revolution
successful. The seeds of tactical success sprouted strategic disaster,
however, as the Army found itself unable to grapple with strategy. Hence
the debate over counterinsurgency operations has dominated military
discourse from before the “Surge.” This situation also reflected the
larger American cultural prominence of technocrats. A recent article
21      Ibid., 346-347, Ricks at once criticizes the downplaying of education, while crediting DePuy
with creating a better Army; and Suzanne C. Nielson, An Army Transformed: The US Army’s PostVietnam Recovery and the Dynamics of Change in Military Organizations, Letort Paper (Carlisle, PA: US
Army War College, September 2010), 42-44, also indicates DePuy’s tactical focus as necessary for
the post-Vietnam Army.
22      S.L.A Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command (Norman, OK: University
of Oklahoma Press, 1947); Peter R. Mansoor, The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American
Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 1-15, discusses the
historiography (including Marshall) of the pro-Wehrmacht and the pro-American arguments, while
his book adds heft to the latter category. For inflated German accounts see B.H. Liddell Hart, The
German Generals Talk: Startling Revelations from Hitler’s High Command (New York: William Morrow and
Company Inc., 1975 reprint of 1948).
23      Mansoor, GI Offensive, 197.
24      For Wehrmacht fighting cohesion see Kevin Farrell, “Culture of Confidence: The Tactical
Excellence of the German Army of the Second World War,” in Leadership: The Warrior’s Art, ed.
Christopher Kolenda (Carlisle, PA: The Army War College Foundation Press, 2001), 177-203. Unlike
members of the Wehrmacht who perpetrated war crimes with the sanction of official policy, US
Army personnel sometimes committed atrocities of their own volition in instances such as My Lai
in Vietnam War and post-911 in the handling of prisoners such as at Abu Ghraib prison. Columbia
Professor Adam Tooze’s lecture to West Point history faculty connected US Army atrocities with the
institution’s focus on the Wehrmacht, US Military Academy, West Point, NY, Spring 2012.
25      Robert W. Hutchinson, “The Weight of History: Wehrmacht Officers, the US Army Historical
Division, and US Military Doctrine, 1945-1956,” Journal of Military History, 78, no. 4 (October 2014):
1321-1348. A recent Pentagon study also examined Wehrmacht replacement practices, email with
US Department of the Army staff February-March 2014.
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in Military Review highlights this emphasis in the Army by conflating
managers with leaders, a tradition emerging with the “Whiz Kids”
of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s reign.26 An emphasis on
techno-bureaucracy obscures the larger issue of strategic failure, which
efficient management will not ameliorate.
The rise of civilian managers in the Department of Defense, like
McNamara and Donald Rumsfeld, and an emphasis on equality between
the services, resulted in the structural demotion of senior Army leaders.
General George Marshall, for instance, served as chief military advisor
with unfettered access to President Franklin D. Roosevelt in WWII.27
Reorganizations such as the National Security Acts of 1947 and 1949, and
Goldwater-Nichols of 1986 created unnecessary bureaucracy between
senior generals and the president, as well as demoted the Army’s influence to an equal footing with the other services. This relegation to equal
status occurred even as the Army served as the nation’s strategic force,
shouldering the majority burden of war efforts in personnel, logistics
(including support to the other services), and casualties.28 Although the
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), serves as the President’s chief
military advisor, the position rotates between services and is a staff billet
without authority in the way that WWII (and prior) Army Chiefs of
Staff and generals of the army exercised prerogatives. These structural
changes diminished the Army’s strategic influence on US policy, and
failures in many ground wars since 1945 indicates the nation is not better
for it. Other Army structural changes set in motion months before the
Korean War accelerated the shift in institutional culture from strategy
to tactics.
The Cold War reversed the United States’ traditional military cycle
of rapidly expanding Army ranks with draftees and then precipitously
demobilizing them following victory.29 Government officials perceived
a worldwide Communist threat that required a standing military, particularly a large conventional Army. These attitudes, encapsulated in
George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” and Winston Churchill’s “Iron
Curtain” speech, coalesced in National Security Memorandum 68 (NSC-68),
which President Harry Truman only endorsed after the North’s invasion
of South Korea.30 This invasion confirmed perceptions of global communism and resulted in a permanently large Army. It also contributed
to the eventual subjugation of strategy to tactics.
Army promotion soon became linked to the command of standing units, the vast majority of which operated below the strategic level.
This linkage contributes to the development of an astrategic officer
corps, in which some officers may disbelieve military leaders have a role
26      Allen and Woods, “Developing Army Enterprise Leaders;” and Dale R. Herspring, The
Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush (Lawrence, KS: University
Press of Kansas, 2005), 121.
27      Ibid., 26-27, for no barrier between the Chief and the President.
28      Ibid., 62, on equalizing the services, Ibid., 64-65, on elevating civilian secretaries; Ibid., 303,
for Goldwater-Nichols increasing the role of Chairman at the expense of the service Chiefs; see
Army Support of Other Services, US Department of the Army, Theater Army, Corps, and Division
Operations, FM 3-94 (Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, 2014), for current Army
support.
29      Jason W. Warren, ed., Drawdown: The American Way of Postwar (New York, NY: New York
University Press, 2016).
30      For these Cold War issues see, John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal
of American National Security Policy During the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
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in formulating military strategy. Antulio Echevarria’s Reconsidering the
American Way of War rightly posits US strategy, in fact, connects political
goals with national strategies, and thus the “American Way of War” is
not astrategic at the national level.31 A strategic fissure has emerged,
however, between the national level and Army entities responsible for
fashioning strategy. Army culture prior to National Security Memorandum
68 received a boost in strategic emphasis, in the interwar years for
instance, where officership revolved around education and broadening,
even including discussions of strategy in officers’ messes. The officer
corps more readily resisted a tactical mindset with few troops available
to command during these lean personnel years.32
The tactical dominion eventually became king of the realm for postKorean War promotion, which the training revolution elevated to the
throne. Summer 2004 in Iraq found Casey upon a tide of sinking strategy and he believed the war was lost before Petraeus temporarily righted
the ship.33 Petraeus’ surge of forces was but a current of success upon an
ocean of failure. Petraeus’ preference for well-educated subordinates and
officer broadening soon receded with his departure to the CIA, in an
Army culture hostile to non-tactical endeavors. In addition to Petraeus
other generals bucked the centurion trend including, Alexander Haig
(SACEUR and Secretary of State), Frederick Woerner (US Southern
Command), and more recently, Daniel Bolger (NATO Training MissionAfghanistan), but in insufficient numbers. Casey, himself son of a general
who was killed in Vietnam, had limited broadening. He became Chief of
Staff of the Army after his tour in Iraq. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
summoned Casey’s predecessor General Peter Schoomacher off the
retirement bench as a swipe at senior Army generals to replace the
marginalized General Eric Shinseki. Schoomacher’s career was mainly
focused on special operations. Shinseki himself completed a masters
degree and then taught at West Point before returning to a predominately tactically focused career. General Raymond Odierno, replacing
Casey in 2011, had commanded effectively at the operational level of war
in Iraq, but maintained a background similar to his predecessors. His
term as CSA eventually originated a number of programs, however, that
may bear strategic fruit, if continued.
The post-911 Chiefs of Staff of the Army generally share a lack of
graduate education and broadening with their Vietnam War counterparts. Neither Westmoreland nor Abrams achieved advanced degrees
and both served in mainly tactical billets.34 Although America’s Abrams
tank was aptly named for the general, headquarters staffs he worked to
reduce would be less well named. He began the short-sighted headquarters reductions that have become a characteristic of the post-Vietnam
Army. This reduction came at the moment sociologist Morris Janowitz
noted that the backgrounds of successful WWII generals were different
from those of the post-1950 era, the latter of which elevated tactical
assignments as the “ideal” career progression. According to Janowitz’s
31      Echevarria, Reconsidering the American Way of War, 165-167.
32      Michael Matheny, “When the Smoke Clears: The Interwar Years as an Unlikely Success
Story,” in Warren, ed., Drawdown.
33      Mansoor, Surge.
34      Westmoreland attended Harvard Business School for only a year and completely lacked
professional military school attendance after West Point.
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analysis, “ranking military leaders displayed an early and persistent propensity for staff work.”35 Abrams’ training revolution did bear fruit in
early battles in the 1980s and beyond, and the Army should maintain
its best practices, but must also emphasize strategic leader development.
Abrams was the embodiment of the shift to the centurion motif,
serving in successive tactical positions, with a telling break only to teach
tactics at the Armor School at Ft. Knox, and later returning as Chief of
Staff, Armor Center. Recent scholarship indicates Abrams’ vaunted role
in Vietnam was less successful than previously accepted, as he simply
advanced programs enacted by Westmoreland.36 Abrams’ distaste for
headquarters personnel with the simultaneous deification of command
billets institutionalized an attitude that smaller staffs can accomplish
the mission while maintaining the contradiction that officers manning
them are less capable than those on track to command soldiers. Some
senior generals confuse poor intra-headquarters leadership and nonbroadened and inexperienced staff with headquarters bloat, eliminating
the very force structure history has repeatedly demonstrated is necessary
for sustained land combat.37 Robust headquarters, besides acting as a
unit’s intellectual center, provide broadening and serve as opportunities
for officers between line billets and educational and professional development assignments. Army leaders have ineptly continued Abrams’
programs, and ironically so, as much as the US Army has sought to ape
the Germans.
The great general staff, the elite organization in the PrussianGerman armed forces, undergirded German tactical prowess. It was
instrumental in the unification of Germany under a Prussian ruler, and
assisted the Second Reich in dominating the European continent from
1866-1918 and again under the Third Reich from 1938 to 1944.38 Adolf
Hitler increasingly usurped the staff’s power and eventually neutered
it, as many American generals have done to Army headquarters since
Vietnam. The US Army fetishized the wrong aspect of the German
army.39
The Army institution has largely failed to achieve strategic results
under the direction of the CSAs after the Korean War. There is no
denying the dedication of these officers, and like Shinseki, some bled
for their country. It would also represent a shallow argument to lay the
failure of national strategy at the feet of the CSAs or any commander.
Failure has reflected structural paradigm shifts, as well as the influence
of domestic politics. The profiles of the CSAs in a hierarchical organization like the Army, however, offer a swampy view into the larger
institutional strategic morass. A comparison of the backgrounds of
CSAs before WWII reveals an earlier crop of strategically broadened
officers.
35      Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 166.
36      Gregory Daddis, Westmoreland’s War: Reassessing American Strategy in Vietnam (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014).
37      Conrad Crane and John A. Bonin, “The Next Task Force Smith: The Danger of Arbitrary
Headquarters Reductions,” War on the Rocks, October 27, 2015.
38      For the rise and effectiveness of the German General Staff see, Geoffrey Wawro, Warfare and
Society in Europe, 1792-1914 (New York: Routledge, 2000), 73-123.
39      The Command and General Staff College in its military history block on the German Wars
of unification does not mention the German staff, Academic Year 2012-2013, Phase II, accessed
September 2015.
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An Earlier Tradition of Broadening

John Schofield, who commanded a division at Gettysburg and
became general of the army (the office prior to CSA) for the lengthy
period of 1888-1895, influenced the Army as the United States emerged
as a world power. Schofield was Superintendent of West Point for
five years. He previously taught “natural and experimental philosophy” (physics) at the Academy (also for five years) and later physics at
Washington University. Besides his division, corps, and Department
of North Carolina (reconstruction) commands, Schofield served “as a
confidential diplomatic emissary to France,” and deployed on “special
mission” to Hawaii.40 Schofield’s educational and broadening assignments were not unique for leading Army officers of this period. Educated
in part by a French officer in Massachusetts before the Civil War, and
wounded four times in it, General Nelson Miles also commanded the
reconstruction of North Carolina, and later defeated Indian resistance
to white expansion. He observed the Greek-Turkish War, and Russian,
German, and French maneuvers, and then commanded US efforts in
Puerto Rico. Miles published three books, two while General of the
Army. This highlights the cultural shift to anti-intellectualism at the
highest ranks, as a former Army commander of the war in Afghanistan
counseled that leaders risked promotion by publishing.41
The first CSA, General Samuel Young, established professional
education at Ft. Leavenworth and served as first president of the Army
War College. The fourth CSA, General James Bell studied law and was
admitted to the bar, while teaching at Southern Illinois University. Bell’s
successor General Leonard Wood was a Medical Doctor, studying at
Harvard Medical School and Boston City Hospital. His replacement
General William Wotherspoon who served three years in the Navy,
taught at Rhode Island College and the General Staff College, and was
also president of the US Army War College, transforming it into an
independent educational institution.
General Tasker Bliss’s career was a mixture of education, broadening,
and, like his predecessors, line assignments. These included French and
artillery instructor at West Point; adjutant of the Artillery School at Ft.
Monroe; recorder on the Board on Interior Waterways; instructor Naval
War College; military attaché to Spain; collector of customs in Havana
and president of the commission to revise the Cuban tariff; Governor of
Moro Province, Philippines; twice President of the US Army War College;
and after his tour as CSA, a delegate to the Paris Peace Conference.
Given his broadening experiences, one might imagine Bliss succeeding in “Phase 4” operations in Iraq. Again highlighting a centurion
mindset, the Army has transformed service as Superintendent of West
Point or the Commandant of the US Army War College as a retirement
billet instead of an opportunity for broadening (General Malin Craig
in 1935 went from Commandant of the US Army War College directly
to Chief of Staff of the Army). General John J. “Black Jack” Pershing,
best known as commander of the Mexican Punitive Expedition and
40     William G. Bell, Commanding Generals and Chiefs of Staff: Portraits & Biographical Sketches
(Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2010), 90, for further biographical information herein
on Generals of the Army and Chiefs of Staff see pages 90-168.
41      Basic Strategic Arts Program, US Army War College lecture, Winter 2014 (non-attribution).
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American Expeditionary Forces in France, also performed in a number
of educational and broadening posts. These comprised obtaining a law
degree while professor of military science and tactics at the University
of Nebraska; the Bureau of Insular Affairs when serving in the Office
of Assistant Secretary of War, an headquarters billet which he created,
unlike modern CSAs who rashly reduce headquarters; military attaché
to Japan; observer of the Russo-Japanese War, and like Bliss, Governor
of Moro Province.
In addition to his legendary career in both World Wars and Korea,
General Douglas MacArthur served as aide to President Theodore
Roosevelt from 1906-1908, service school instructor at Ft. Leavenworth,
and Superintendent of West Point before becoming CSA. Although
some detest MacArthur for “flamboyant” tendencies, he was one of
the best military minds of his generation, conducting one of the “twin
drives” in the Pacific theater of WWII with limited resources and joint
forces across large geographic areas, as he later did at Inchon in Korea.42
Eisenhower served on MacArthur’s staff in the Office of the Chief of
Staff of the Army and the Philippines. Ike was extensively educated
in Army schools, including Leavenworth, the US Army War College,
and the Army Industrial College, while also serving as an instructor at
Leavenworth before his illustrious career in WWII and beyond. The
careers of Bradley, Marshall, and others reflect the broadening paradigm
of a past Army generation that achieved strategic results. In an era before
the proliferation of graduate degrees, the education of these leaders was
exceptional.

A Way Ahead

Instead of maintaining its post-1950 centurion trend, the Army
must develop and promote broadened leaders in the vein of those like
Schofield and Eisenhower to CSA or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the latter position of which an Army officer must occupy during
major ground wars. The caprices of victory are not subject to the politically correct whims of service equality. These officers would foster a
professional intellectual climate by emphasizing education and broadening. Odierno began this initiative with programs such as the Strategic
Broadening Program and Army Strategic Planning and Policy Program,
but these have been implemented in haphazard fashion and should be
expanded and elevated intellectually as a post-Leavenworth offering for
promising mid-grade officers. The Army should proliferate officer education programs such as the US Army War College’s Basic and Advanced
Strategic Arts Programs that educate strategists and colonels, adding
two levels of these courses for junior and senior general officers. The
Army must make a clear distinction between education and training,
which its bureaucracy and attendant budget practices often conflate.43
These initiatives are inexpensive. For the production and maintenance cost of one F-35 fighter, the Army could educate most Active and
Reserve Components officers. Every mid-grade officer should receive at
42      Ricks, The Generals, 197; also Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting
the Second World War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000) are critical of MacArthur.
43      For example, the US Army War College recently reported to Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC), and Army educational programs are funded with training in the same budgetary category.
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least a masters degree at a well-regarded civilian institution. This serves
not only the personal development of the officer and the intellectual
foundation of the institution, but to influence civilian peers and relate
the Army story.44 An emphasis on education during drawdowns and
after major conflicts would not constitute an original program, as the
Army concentrated its meager resources on education between World
Wars.45
To not only right the ship but keep it afloat, the Army must undertake
a comprehensive strategic study of not only the past 14 years, but also the
post-draft era.46 Recommendations should include structural changes to
prioritize Army prerogatives as the lead service for major land conflicts,
and reduce the barriers that allowed business-minded strategic amateurs
such as McNamara and Rumsfeld to interdict military recommendations
of the institution’s senior leaders to the President.
The tradition that preceded National Security Memorandum 68 is one
of a cadre Army, while also maintaining a varying quantity of a professional force. Facing current manning constraints, the Army should
return to a cadre force that would also provide adequate opportunities
for broadening assignments of the kind the CSAs before Vietnam experienced, without these assignments prejudicing career progression. In a
large-scale crisis, the cadre from the training base would serve as leadership for new battalions with the Reserve Component assuming training
duties. The emphasis on training should be maintained for remaining
units, which the extra number of non-commissioned officers and officers from cadre units would rotate to fill after broadening assignments.
Training emphasis should be expanded for echelons above corps.47
The Army must rebuild its headquarters where broadened officers
would help guide strategic decision-making. In the tradition that Abrams
accelerated, the institution reduced the wrong headquarters, forcing division and corps headquarters to cover the shortfall. Division and corps
staffs are poor substitutes for the theater level because of experience
and rank disparities. The obvious solution was to maintain theater army
headquarters at strength and appropriate grade level. Combining US
Forces Command (FORSCOM) with US Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC), as well as reducing Medical Command would
have allowed the 25 percent reduction to remain in place without compromising warfighting headquarters, as well as those performing critical
“Phase 0” activities like security cooperation and “setting the theater.”
FORSCOM and TRADOC were created in the early 1970s to replace
US Continental Army Command (CONARC), and this arrangement has
outlived its usefulness and furthered the centurion paradigm. A return
to the CONARC model would help balance the Army’s training priorities, and serve as a conduit for better Active and Reserve Components
relations, as well as ease the raising of forces with an updated cadre
system. McArthur formed the precursor of Continental Army Command
when he “activated his 4-army structure in 1932,” understanding solid
44      Tim Kane, “Why Our Best Officers Are Leaving,” The Atlantic 307, no. 1 (January/February
2011): 80-85.
45      Matheny, “When the Smoke Clears.”
46      Ricks, The Generals, 455.
47      Cadre and other personnel issues are beyond the scope of this article, but worth noting in
the context of broadening.
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command and control required an extra layer of headquarters between
corps commanders and the CSA.48 He based this decision on the never
enacted three field armies concept created by the 1920 National Defense
Act.49 Instead of the current bifurcated training system, where TRADOC
is the proponent for individual training and FORSCOM oversees collective training at the training centers, a CONARC model would re-apply
a regional approach to training management with three sub-command
regional army commanders responsible for all training of both active
and reserve territorial formations. TRADOC’s and FORSCOM’s staffs
would merge, while TRADOC’s three-star sub-commands would
remain. Central Command would receive assignment of III Corps
(FORSCOM must assign forces per Title 10 US Code para. 162), while
CONARC would maintain XVIII Corps as the Global Response Force
(GRF).50

Conclusion

The Army must alter the gears of its personnel machine to produce
the next generation of generals in the mold of Black Jack, Marshall, Ike,
or the American Caesar, to improve the nation’s chances of achieving its
strategic objectives. Poor national policy or an implacable adversary may
still overcome the best leaders’ plans, but there is less chance of success
without a deep bench of strategically capable generals. Demoting the
centurion-focused Abrams’ archetype to its proper place in the legion,
the Army must merge its successful model for training with a renewed
broadening program from yesteryear to develop strategic leaders and
ultimately repair strategic capability. This will include advocating for the
reduction of governmental structural barriers formed since WWII and
the righting of poor institutional history, both of which have contributed
to the Army’s overly tactical focus. Cadre formations and reversed headquarters reductions with a return to CONARC will assist in the growth
of a strategic culture. The Army must move beyond a simple debate
over operational frameworks and take common sense and time-honored
measures within current budget limitations to reform its internal culture
and recreate an institution capable of conceiving of victory. Without
leaders capable of developing an intellectual framework for winning, the
Army will continue to produce disappointing results.

48      Jean R. Moenk, A History of Command and Control of Army Forces in the Continental United States,
1919-1972 (Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters, United States Continental Army Command, 1972), 56.
49      Ibid.
50      A number of speakers at the USAWC have denigrated the CONARC template without
distinguishing between a necessary, but poorly administered organization, and the model itself. Nonattributed guest speakers at the Basic Strategy Program Course, US Army War College, 2014-2015.

